Pejoratives and Testimonial Injustice: Precis by Julija Perhat
145
Croatian Journal of Philosophy
Vol. XVII, No. 50, 2017
Pejoratives and Testimonial Injustice: 
Precis
JULIJA PERHAT
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, 
University of Rijeka, Rijeka, Croatia
Testimonial injustice is a hot topic in social epistemology. My own work 
is concerned with pejoratives (in particular, gender pejoratives for wom-
en), so in this paper I wish to connect them with such injustice. So, my 
present topic is testimonial injustice perpetrated by the serious use of 
pejoratives, in particular, gender pejoratives. It combines two strands: 
on the one hand, the work on testimonial injustice; and here I shall rely 
on Miranda Fricker’s work, and on the other hand, my own central area 
of interest, (gender) pejoratives. 
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1. Introduction
In this work I try to connect testimonial injustice to gender pejoratives. 
In order to that I fi rst briefl y explain what pejoratives are. Then I move 
on to explaining Fricker’s view on prejudice and stereotypes. I would 
like to show how Fricker’s idea of collective social imagination is indeed 
very plausible and how stereotypes and prejudice are a normal part of 
it. These stereotypes and prejudice typically activate themselves when 
one tries to assess someone’s credibility or trustworthiness and the ac-
tivation of stereotypes and prejudice happens even if one is not aware 
of it. Now, I think that language is an important part of socialization 
and can increase the testimonial injustice. Since stereotypes and preju-
dice have the main role (as Fricker showed in her book Epistemic Injus-
tice) in the process of attributing credibility to the speaker, or in other 
words, sexist prejudice decrease the credibility assigned to women, I 
try to show how the use of pejoratives can develop and sustain stereo-
types and prejudice and thus infl uence our perception of the speaker. 
Furthermore, not only can pejoratives have an infl uence on our percep-
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tion of the speaker but their permanent and systematic use has an 
infl uence on the systematic underestimation of credibility of certain 
groups of people (and consequently on their self-esteem and other in-
tellectual virtues). In this precis I am particularly interested in how 
pejoratives infl uence the underestimation of credibility of women and 
I think that the use of pejoratives can indirectly and directly increase 
the testimonial injustice in the second step and how they perpetuate 
the testimonial injustice done to women. So, the question is how should 
we cope with such phenomena in our society? In the last part I try 
to give a possible answer to that question by presenting and pointing 
out possible virtues that we should have in order to avoid the use of 
pejoratives and I also try to give an answer to the question about the 
testimonial sensibility that we should have in order to avoid the use 
of pejoratives. Fricker claims that we should develop testimonial sen-
sibility and I point out virtues that can help in that process. The idea 
is that one possible virtue that we may want to nurture is the love of 
knowledge so that we could avoid the non-culpable mistakes. Another 
virtue that we should have in order to avoid pejoratives as hearers of 
such language is the virtue of autonomy, and, fi nally, it is evident that 
it would be virtuous not to use pejoratives and that users of pejoratives 
obviously have testimonial insensibility instead of testimonial sensibil-
ity as Fricker argues in her book Epistemic Injustice.
2. Pejoratives
There is a wide array of pejorative words, but here I am concerned with 
those that are gender related, namely sexist pejoratives for women. 
Some of the examples of sexist pejoratives are English pejoratives: 
bitch, cunt, whore and witch; and their Croatian synonyms would be: 
kuja, pička, kurva and vještica.
So, let me briefl y give a semantic analysis of the word whore. There 
are three meanings of the word whore.
The fi rst one is the literal meaning where the word whore means 
prostitute. A prostitute sells her body for money which is considered to 
be bad and immoral.
The second meaning refers to a promiscuous woman who sleeps with 
a lot of men, but the reference to money is no longer a part of the mean-
ing (she, unlike a prostitute, does not “sell” her body), so we can say 
that this second meaning of the word whore is a half dead metaphor. 
But, the qualities that did stay represented within the very meaning 
(sense) of the word whore are such that the woman who the speaker is 
referring to by the term in question is bad and immoral because she 
sleeps with a lot of men. So, something negative and devaluating is 
rooted in the very meaning of the word whore. When someone calls a 
woman a whore what is rooted in the meaning of the word is that she is 
bad, immoral, dirty… So, when someone uses the word whore to refer 
to a woman, in its presumed extension it means that she will sleep with 
almost anyone (promiscuous behavior), that she is easy, etc.
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Used in its third meaning the word whore can apply to “anyone who 
sells out their principles” (Hughes 2006: 493). So, it does not need to 
refer to women, it can also refer to politicians, for example. This third 
meaning of the word whore has no sexual reference. However, it does 
mean that the target is corrupt or immoral because of selling their 
principles.
Recently, a new meaning of the word whore has arisen. It can be 
classifi ed as the fourth meaning of the word (reference of which is the 
Urban dictionary). It refers to a person that is doing something exces-
sively and repeatedly which is very annoying. The link to the literal 
meaning of prostitute is obviously lost (as it is in the third meaning), 
but we can fi nd the link with promiscuity (even though the sexual com-
ponent is lost) because promiscuity can signify repetition which is con-
sidered to be annoying and bad.
The most interesting meaning of the word whore for the discussion 
here is the second one. In the corresponding case what the speaker 
intends to do is to degrade the target (a woman whom he refers to as 
a whore).
Now I want to give a background on socialization and stereotypes, 
and also, a short overview of empirical material on stereotypes which I 
will then connect with Fricker’s theorizing, and, also, address the issue 
of defi ning stereotypes.
3. Miranda Fricker’s outline of testimonial injustice
I am relying on Fricker’s idea of testimonial injustice which she claims 
to be a normal part of the discourse, unfortunately. Here, we need some 
background, so I briefl y summarize her main points that I fi nd useful 
for my project. Before Fricker goes on to explain what exactly testimo-
nial injustice is, she turns to the idea of identity power which impacts 
our discursive relations.
3.1. Power and testimonial exchange
Fricker explains that there is “at least one form of social power which 
requires not only practical social co-ordination but also an imaginative 
social co-ordination” (Fricker 2007: 14). This is where Fricker presents 
us with an idea of identity power:
There can be operations of social power which are dependent upon agents 
having shared conceptions of social identity – conceptions alive in the collec-
tive social imagination that govern, for instance, what it is or means to be a 
woman or a man, or what it means to be gay or straight, young or old, and 
so on (Fricker 2007: 14).
Fricker gives an example of gender acting as one arena of identity 
power and stresses how an active use of gender power can be when a 
man uses his identity as a man to infl uence woman’s actions. The ex-
ample that Fricker presents us with is the case where a man silences 
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a woman by emphasizing that she cannot possibly be right about her 
suspicions about the possible murderer because, as he explains, all of 
her suspicions are only based on female intuition as opposed to facts 
(Fricker 2007). Also, identity power can be structural or agential.
But, how does identity power infl uence testimonial injustice. Here 
comes the thought that will be central in the sequel. Fricker writes:
I shall argue that identity power is an integral part of the mechanism of 
testimonial exchange, because of the need for hearers to use social stereo-
types as heuristic in their spontaneous assessment of their interlocutor’s 
credibility. This use of stereotypes may be entirely proper, or it may be mis-
leading, depending on the stereotype. Notably, if the stereotype embodies a 
prejudice that works against the speaker, then two things follow: there is an 
epistemic dysfunction in the exchange – the hearer makes an unduly defl at-
ed judgment of the speaker’s credibility, perhaps missing out on knowledge 
as a result; and the hearer does something ethically bad—the speaker is 
wrongfully undermined in her capacity as a knower (Fricker 2007: 16–17).
Now, prejudice can result either in credibility excess (when “a speaker 
is given more credibility than she otherwise would have”) or in credibil-
ity defi cit (when “a speaker receives less credibility than she otherwise 
would have”) (Fricker 2007). However, what will be of most interest 
here is the credibility defi cit which can lead to testimonial injustice. In 
the cases of testimonial injustice the ethical poison “must derive from 
some ethical poison in the judgment of the hearer… The proposal I am 
heading for is that the ethical poison in question is that of prejudice” 
(Fricker 2007: 22).
This brings us to the possible link with pejoratives, namely the im-
portance of the stereotype. I want to point out the connection between 
gender pejoratives and the way they can indirectly increase the testi-
monial injustice done to women and that is already part of the imagina-
tive social co-ordination.
3.2 Prejudice and stereotypes
First, how should we defi ne stereotypes? Fricker is wisely not prejudg-
ing the badness of pejoratives: so, since she is using the word stereo-
types neutrally, she will need a broader defi nition. Indeed, she defi nes 
stereotypes as “widely held associations between a given social group 
and one or more attributes” (Fricker 2007: 30). When defi ned like that 
“stereotyping entails a cognitive commitment to some empirical gen-
eralization about a given social group (‘women are intuitive’)” (Fricker 
2007: 31) and that generalization can be more or less strong.
She goes on to say that we can suppose that an identity prejudice 
is at work in the stereotype. In that case we have to understand that a 
stereotype can be just a non-culpable mistake (an ‘honest mistake’). Ar-
play (2003) gives a good example of a boy who has a belief that women 
are not capable of abstract thinking, at least not as men are. Since he 
lives in a community where all the evidence he could have gathered 
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suggests that women are indeed not capable of such thinking, we can 
say that he made an honest mistake. If the boy was to come across 
some counter-evidence and he does not change his belief than we can 
say that he does something ethically and epistemically bad (Fricker 
2007).
In these cases there exists a negative identity prejudice which has 
an ethically bad motivation behind it, so the identity prejudice that 
Fricker is focused on and that I will also be examining are “prejudices 
with a negative valence held against people qua social type” (Fricker 
2007: 35).
Therefore, Fricker gives a defi nition of what negative identity-prej-
udicial stereotype is: “A widely held disparaging association between a 
social group and one or more attributes, where this association embod-
ies a generalization that displays some (typically, epistemically culpa-
ble) resistance to counter-evidence owing to an ethically bad affective 
investment” (Fricker 2007: 35).
Now, Fricker goes on to say that identity prejudice “distorts the 
hearer’s perception of the speaker” (Fricker 2007: 36). To clarify exactly 
how that can happen Fricker takes the explanation of the idea of a 
stereotype proposed by Walter Lippmann (1965). He “described social 
stereotypes as ‘pictures in our head’” (Fricker 2007: 37). These can lin-
ger on in our psychology and affect the hearer’s patters of judgment 
even when our belief system in not in accordance with this. An example 
given by Fricker on this point is of a feminist who doesn’t take a word 
of her female colleagues seriously.
Fricker takes this (the stealth mode of social stereotypes which per-
sist in our psychology despite ourselves) to be evidence or at least sup-
port the idea that testimonial injustice happens all the time. She agrees 
with Shklar (1990) that injustice is a normal social baseline, and she 
thinks that also testimonial injustice is a normal part of the discourse. 
She also emphasizes the wrong that is done to someone when treated in 
this way (an ethical wrong that can be damaging) which is still viewed 
as something trivial (Fricker 2007).
Fricker then moves on to further develop this point. She claims that 
testimonial injustice can do little or no harm but that it can also be seri-
ously harmful when it is systematic. Fricker recognizes epistemic harm 
where “knowledge that would be passed on to a hearer is not received” 
(Fricker 2007: 43). However, Fricker is more concerned with the im-
mediate wrong that the hearer does to the speaker. She emphasizes 
that the ability to give knowledge to others is signifi cant for human 
beings. So, when someone suffers a testimonial injustice they are not 
only degraded as knowers but also as humans. Considering this aspect 
of harm, she concludes: “The harm will take different forms, but they 
are both cases of identity-prejudicial exclusion from the community of 
epistemic trust, and so they both belong to the same category of injus-
tice” (Fricker 2007: 45–46).
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Fricker also discusses the secondary aspect of harm where she ex-
plores two categories; practical and epistemic dimension of harm. To 
explain what practical dimension of harm would be she presents an ex-
ample of a testimonial injustice in a courtroom where one can be found 
guilty. The second category is again that of an epistemic harm where: 
The recipient of a one-off testimonial injustice may lose confi dence in his 
belief, or in his judgment for it, so that he ceases to satisfy the conditions for 
knowledge; or, alternatively, someone with a background experience of per-
sistent testimonial injustice may lose confi dence in her general intellectual 
abilities to such an extent that she is genuinely hindered in her educational 
or other intellectual development (Fricker 2007: 47–48).
All of this can have an impact on the formation of our identity if, of 
course, the testimonial injustice is persistent and systematic (we can 
imagine a woman interested in politics but living in a society that 
doesn’t allow women to vote; in such a case, she is to lose an essential 
part of herself by not being a part of a trustful conversation). One (in 
our example a woman) may also come to resemble the stereotype work-
ing against her (she may internalize the stereotype and start to believe 
that she is indeed inferior and act according to it).
I would like to focus on the harm done to women in our Western 
liberal society thus emphasizing that our society is indeed still patriar-
chal, even if we are not so keen to admit it. And there is a connection 
between the language we use to speak about women and the way lan-
guage can indirectly (and sometimes directly) increase the testimonial 
injustice done to women. Also, I would like to focus on importance of 
virtues that we should have in order to avoid the use of pejoratives and 
try to answer the question what is the sensibility that we should train 
in order to avoid them.
4. Pejoratives and testimonial injustice
By calling a woman a whore one undermines her dignity by not treat-
ing her as an equal member of the society (remember the brief analysis 
that is offered in section 2). When using such sexist speech the goal 
of the speaker is to degrade. So, the (intended) perlocutionary effect 
is to degrade the target and to treat her as less valuable than other 
members of the society. It is worth noting that it does not matter for 
the woman if she is physically present at the time of the utterance. 
The degrading of the target happens even if the target is not present 
and even if there is no face-to-face confrontation. The term whore is 
equally offensive for a woman whether she is present at the time of the 
utterance or not. Also, when the speaker uses such terms his intended 
perlocutionary effect is for the hearers to agree with him, too. It is, of 
course, clear that the use of pejoratives is not itself a testimonial in-
justice (there may be some similar consequences such as undermining 
a woman’s self-esteem, which is also the result of systematic skepti-
cism towards women’s credibility, but it isn’t a testimonial injustice in 
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itself). Now, the question is how does using pejoratives contribute to 
testimonial injustice happening to women?1
We can take an example of the speaker using pejoratives (the word 
whore, for example) and being in a position of power2 in which case we 
can only imagine the scope of the harm being done. Suppose that an 
executive director of a certain company is talking to his young employ-
ees and that he refers to his (and their) female colleagues as whores 
or bitches. As I already explained the (intended) perlocutionary effect 
is that the hearers agree with him. Since the speaker is in a position 
of power and if the hearers are already mentally contaminated, it is 
plausible to assume that the pejorative can increase the already ex-
istent identity-prejudicial stereotype (which is, as Fricker explained, 
present in the collective social imagination). It can also be the case 
(a worst case scenario) that the speaker receives credibility excess in 
which case the perlocutionary effect on the speakers to agree with the 
hearer is even greater. But, in any case pejoratives can, as we have 
seen, increase the already existent identity-prejudicial stereotype thus 
indirectly increasing the testimonial injustice done to women. After all, 
who would trust a whore?3 There are cases where using a pejorative 
can even directly increase testimonial injustice, for example, in cases 
when uttering: “Shut up, you bitch”. Also, to add to Fricker’s claim 
where she described identity-prejudical stereotype as an association 
1 I am here exploring the connection between pejoratives and testimonial 
injustice. However, it seems that pejoratives can infl ict an even greater epistemic 
harm. When using hate speech (for example, calling someone a whore) the person 
who is the target of such speech can internalize all the bad things that are meant/
implied by the expression in question and thus hate speech may infl uence the very 
character of a person (one referred to as a Nigger can indeed start acting lazy, stupid 
and so on). This very interesting effect of hate speech is something to explore in the 
future due to the limitation of this paper. 
2 By the term “position of power” I mean both the identity power identifi ed by 
Fricker and the economical power excersized through the person being an executive 
of a certain company.
3 Now, let’s imagine a speaker who calls his friend a whore, but who is an 
epistemically disciplined person and he would never use a person’s being a whore to 
determine her testimonial worth. However, the people who hear that comment do 
take her less seriously. It seems that the utterer is not guilty of testimonial injustice, 
so the question remains: who is guilty of what? (This comment was made by Johanna 
Schnurr at a conference in Dubrovnik 2014).
So, in this particular case we can speculate that the speaker is not directly 
guilty of testimonial injustice since, as we have established, he does not undermine 
the person’s testimonial worth, but he certainly is guilty of indirectly increasing 
testimonial injustice since he is using a pejorative in a certain context. This is more 
of a consequentialist view where the person is contributing in perpetuating the 
society where certain groups of people can be degraded by using such pejoratives, 
and consequently indirectly increasing the testimonial injustice because of using 
such a pejorative to describe a person and he /she should be aware of its effect on 
the hearers. The only case where the speaker cannot be considered culpable is a case 
already described by Fricker where a speaker only has evidence that support his 
prejudicial belief.
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which “embodies a generalization that displays some (typically, epis-
temically culpable) resistance to counter-evidence owing to an ethically 
bad affective investment” (Fricker 2007: 35), it seems that pejoratives 
create a context where one is prone to resist any counter-evidence that 
may occur.
Now, let’s note here that there are certain pejoratives which can 
increase credibility4 but in this paper I am interested only in sexist pe-
joratives for women which, I think, usually lower credibility. So, when 
calling someone a bitch or a whore, you actually want to degrade (re-
member that we are concerned with the literal, serious use of pejora-
tives as opposed to appropriated uses or just mentions—quotes) and if 
you succeed then the person would not be taken seriously in the future, 
so you would actually lower her credibility by degrading her. It seems 
fair to assume that these kinds of pejoratives would attack sincerity 
more than they would attack knowledge. For example, you could trust 
a person (who was referred to as a whore) when she says that it is rain-
ing outside. But, you wouldn’t trust her when she would claim to be in 
love. Although, in my opinion, it also seems fair to assume that calling 
someone a whore or referring to them by some other (gender) pejora-
tive would actually lower their knowledge-status in the sense that they 
wouldn’t be taken seriously in, for example, the workplace (if you think 
someone is a whore, this will probably screen off any considerations 
of qualities such as being knowledgeable or an expert, and also raise 
doubts that she got a good status due to her expertise at work suggest-
ing that she got where she is by other, less respectable means).
Another point that I would like to draw is the fact that, when talk-
ing about sexist pejoratives for women, the important thing to note 
is that they go with sexist stereotypes about women. These kinds of 
pejoratives are interesting because they carry rich content (the neg-
ative valence is rooted in the meaning), which means that one word 
can carry a lot of power and using them to degrade another person is 
certainly more appealing to most people than using another form of 
communication (for example than just saying “She is promiscuous and 
that is bad and immoral”). Because of this my opinion is that we can 
talk about linguistic injustice which can happen when somebody uses a 
pejorative to refer to (a) wom(a)en. So, when calling someone a whore, 
what you mean is that the person is promiscuous and that is bad, she 
has a loose moral, she’s dirty, and you probably shouldn’t get romanti-
cally involved with her. In general, for a pejorative to infl ict linguistic 
injustice (and to degrade) it would have to carry a stereotype in its 
content which, I think, sexist pejoratives do.
Now, the next question to be asked is how to cope with such phe-
nomena? Above all, if the conclusion is that the serious use of pejora-
tives should be avoided, how should this be done? In previous sections 
4 Pejoratives such as nerd or swat, which was pointed out by T. Williamson at 
The Linguistics and Philosophy conference in Dubrovnik 2014.
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I have argued that pejoratives sustain an unjust system by indirectly 
increasing testimonial injustice. Now, one way of dealing with pejora-
tives is to have certain virtues in order to avoid the use of pejoratives; 
this might help to answer the question about the testimonial sensibil-
ity that we should develop in order to avoid pejoratives.
It is important to note that one can use pejoratives and make a 
non-culpable mistake or one can use them merely as provocation or 
sarcasm. One can make a non-culpable mistake and a good example 
is given by Arpaly (in Fricker 2007: 33) where she describes a boy who 
doesn’t have any access to knowledge and therefore it is understand-
able if he thinks that women are somehow inferior to men. But that 
is why it is important to have the virtue of love of knowledge and as 
Roberts and Wood explain: “The virtue of love of knowledge packages 
a desire for knowledge, along with the sense of the relative importance 
of truths, and thus which truths merit pursuit. The social side of the 
love of knowledge includes a willingness and ability to convey relevant 
truths to others” (Roberts and Wood 2007: 165). So, non-culpable mis-
takes can happen but if we have a virtue of love of knowledge then as 
our knowledge grows, the non-culpable mistakes will be fewer. 
The worst kind of use of pejoratives would be to use them in order 
to spread and deepen the injustice (as I have emphasized before, this 
use of the pejorative and this range of a typical pejorative is of inter-
est in this paper). In order to avoid this we, as hearers of such speech, 
should have the virtue of autonomy and intellectual autonomy disposes 
us to be appropriately dependent on others’ intellectual guidance and 
achievements (Roberts and Woods 2007: 267). So, in order to reject the 
use of pejoratives in a hate-fi lled environment what we should have as 
a virtue is, I think, intellectual autonomy where we rely on ourselves. 
In that case we would not just agree with what the speaker who is using 
sexist speech is saying, so his intent (that we agree with him) would fail.
5. Conclusion
I tried to connect the idea of testimonial injustice with the theory of 
pejoratives. Here is my argument in a nutshell: one way of forming 
stereotypes is through language because language is an important part 
of socialization. If we use language to spread hatred (which is the case 
in using pejorative for degrading the target) then language becomes 
a harmful weapon. Therefore, pejoratives can indirectly (and directly) 
increase the testimonial injustice. I have also argued in favor of culti-
vating some virtues in order to avoid the use of pejoratives, but some 
things still have to be said about the users of pejoratives.
Thus, the question left unanswered is the question about the user(s) 
of pejoratives. We can say that the one that uses pejoratives did not en-
gage in self-critical refl ection and Fricker also notes that for a hearer to 
identify the impact of identity power in their credibility judgment, the 
hearers must also be alert to the impact the speaker’s (and their own) 
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social identity may have on their credibility judgment. However as 
Fricker (2007) argues, it is not only the user of pejoratives who should 
engage in self-critical refl ection, but also the hearers who should con-
stantly question which prejudice may interfere in the discourse thus 
avoiding the lack of credibility they assign to the speaker. As noted 
earlier we all have unconscious processes and that is why this virtue 
is probably the most helpful one in assessing our own stereotypes and 
prejudice (even if we are not fully aware of all of our prejudice I think 
that this virtue can help develop our testimonial sensitivity5). Once we 
realize that we may have certain prejudice we can act in order to avoid 
them. Also, this virtue decreases the amount of non-culpable mistakes 
because it makes us constantly question possible prejudice that may 
infl uence the assessment of the credibility of the speaker. If one fails to 
engage in critical self-refl ection then one also may fail to recognize the 
prejudice that is contaminating his belief system (Fricker 2007). As I 
have already pointed out, this virtue may apply to users of pejoratives 
because they should also question their belief system and, of course, 
change it if presented with counter-evidence. I think that the users of 
pejoratives (with the intent to degrade) do not possess the respect of 
the autonomy of others. Consider Kant’s second formulation of the cat-
egorical imperative which states that we should never treat humanity 
in another person merely as a means to an end. If we do so, we do not 
respect that person and we violate their autonomy because a person 
who is treated merely as a means to an end, instead of an end in them-
selves, cannot be autonomous. The user of pejoratives violates all of 
the above. It is clear that the user of pejoratives has not trained his/her 
testimonial sensibility (and the training of our testimonial sensibility 
is necessary if we were to comprise virtues needed to avoid pejoratives). 
Quite the opposite, the speaker has testimonial insensibility. It would 
be virtuous not to use pejoratives (if they are used to degrade).
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